The expanding role of the capital market in government and corporate financing, alongside its increasing penetration among households, underscores the imperative to reorganize the supervisory structure and amend the Securities Market Act (approved in 2005), as existing regulatory frameworks are incapable of covering new needs and managing emerging risks. Key challenges include the weak governance standing of the regulatory body, susceptibility to political and sectoral decisions, a lack of effective mechanisms for managing conflicts of interest, and inefficiencies in decision-making and enforcement regarding even minor matters (such as fluctuation limits and base volume), which transform into costly crises. Furthermore, the dependency of the supervisory structure on the High Council of Securities and Exchange and the overlap of roles (such as the head of the Securities and Exchange Organization serving as the council's secretary) diminish independence and accountability. Proposed strategies emphasize fundamental legislative reform with the participation of all stakeholders, the elimination or redesign of the High Council of Securities and Exchange and its replacement with an independent governing board, the selection of members through a joint government-parliament mechanism based on expertise and experience (at least ten years of relevant managerial background), ensuring a non-governmental majority among members to achieve genuine independence, formulating strict conflict-of-interest guidelines to recuse individuals from decisions involving vested interests, separating the council secretary from the SEO presidency, and rotational member composition to maintain dynamism. Additionally, delegating broader executive authorities to exchanges while focusing the organization on its supervisory role, reforming the disciplinary violation handling system, and establishing a capital market advisory cluster to bridge academia and policymakers are proposed as complementary mechanisms.